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The Case for Minimum Teaching Standards
Abstract
Author's Note: The following was sent to the Wharton faculty in November, 1989, challenging a set of
proposals by the Wharton Teaching Committee.1 The committee's proposal was presented as an "all or
nothing" choice. Despite a substantial amount of support for the position stated below, the Wharton
Committee recommendations were passed as originally proposed; this includes punitive measures for
faculty who get low ratings (referred to below as the committee's Proposal #1). The proposals said that
for tenure or promotion, a faculty member must get better than an "average" rating (3.0 on a five point
scale). The vote was close. It seems likely that Proposal #1 would have been defeated had a secret ballot
been conducted on this item alone. Action was not taken on any of the nine proposals in my paper, and
neither of the proposals on process were accepted. Since that time, faculty from other schools have read
the memo and suggested that it be reprinted in Almanac in order to gain further faculty comment. They
are concerned that similar events in their schools may affect the quality of the educational environment.
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The Case for Minimum Teaching Standards
J. Scott Armstrong
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA
Author's Note: The following was sent to the Wharton faculty in November, 1989, challenging a set of proposals
by the Wharton Teaching Committee. 1 The committee's proposal was presented as an "all or nothing" choice.
Despite a substantial amount of support for the position stated below, the Wharton Committee recommendations
were passed as originally proposed; this includes punitive measures for faculty who get low ratings (referred to
below as the committee's Proposal #1). The proposals said that for tenure or promotion, a faculty member must get
better than an "average" rating (3.0 on a five point scale). The vote was close. It seems likely that Proposal #1 would
have been defeated had a secret ballot been conducted on this item alone. Action was not taken on any of the nine
proposals in my paper, and neither of the proposals on process were accepted. Since that time, faculty from other
schools have read the memo and suggested that it be reprinted in Almanac in order to gain further faculty comment.
They are concerned that similar events in their schools may affect the quality of the educational environment.

We all share the desire to improve the learning environment at Wharton and to have students who will be
satisfied with this environment. While most of the Wharton Teaching Committee's recommendations are consistent
with these aims, I believe that recommendation #1, to "Establish Minimum Standards for Acceptable Teaching,"'
will be detrimental to learning. I therefore recommend that we reject proposal #1. This letter describes how I
reached this conclusion, suggests alternatives, and recommends a process for resolving tie issues.2

Factors Favoring Proposal #1
1.

It communicates that something is being done.3

2.

It may raise the short-term satisfaction level among students.

3.

It may help to increase the efforts of those faculty who currently invest little effort.

Factors Against Proposal #1
1. Teacher ratings do not provide a useful measure of learning. Unfortunately, I had not bothered to read
the expensive literature on this subject hen I was involved in the implementation of Wharton 's Teacher Evaluation
system. The literature contradicted my basic assumptions cm this topic. Numerous empirical studies have been published on the; relationship between teacher ratings and learning. Some studies show positive relationships and some
show negative ones. Typically the effects are small. (See Dubin and Taveggia, 1968, for a review of this literature.)
One such study compared the performance of students in 11 sections of a calculus course at Stanford; participants in
the lower rated courses performed significantly better on a common examination at the end of the course (Rodin and
Rodin, 1972.) Another study, the "Dr. Fox study," showed that an actor with a completely meaningless script was
able to deliver a one-hour lecture followed by a 30-minute discussion and to achieve high ratings (Naftulin, et al.
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A faculty committee appointed by the Dean.
Some historical background may be of interest. I have been teaching at Wharton since 1968 and have taught at
eight other schools in seven different countries. Shortly after arriving at Wharton, 1 convinced some MBA
students that there should be a course evaluation and I worked with them to introduce the first evaluation system.
3
Some people refer to this as the politician's syllogism: "Something must be done. This is, something. Therefore,
this must be done."
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1973). Finally, in a massive study using before and after measures of knowledge of economics, participant ratings of
basic economic courses had no relationship to learning (Attiyeh and Lumsden, 1972).
2. On theoretical grounds, one might expect teacher ratings to harm learning. One principle of learning is
that the learner should feel responsible for the learning (Armstrong, 1980; Armstrong, 1983; Condry, 1977; Tough,
1982). Teacher ratings communicate that the teacher is responsible for changing the student. Students are implicitly
expected to play a passive role and then to evaluate the teacher's performance instead of their own performance.
3. Another theoretical argument is that evaluation tends to interfere with open communication. This would
be expected to be detrimental to the learning process in that teachers may not provide as accurate feedback.
4. Teacher evaluations can be misused. Students who are doing poorly in a course can claim that the
teacher is not competent in order to imply that the student was not at fault. (This applies not only to ratings, but also
to other aspects of an environment that puts student satisfaction rather than learning as the primary goal.) This
misuse of evaluations has been gaining in popularity. I understand (hearsay) that it is a popular strategy at state
universities that stress teacher evaluations.
5. Unfavorable changes in course content may be expected. Learning involves frustration. It means that
some prior behaviors are not optimal. (For example, tell a smoker to stop smoking and you will get a negative
reaction.) To obtain good ratings, it is preferable to avoid disconfirming evidence and to reinforce what people
already believe (Zelby, 1974). In my studies, I have found that experiential learning produces some "hostile
alienated objectors" (Armstrong, 1980). Techniques for getting high ratings are often at odds with learning (e.g., it is
a good idea to reinforce what students already believe rather than to imply that their current approach to problems is
deficient; it is good to avoid topics where the research findings are not clear cut; it is desirable to meet expectations
of students, such as that the teacher is responsible for their learning.) Content also tends to "pop management" and
current events. As an analogy to this focus on short-term satisfaction, consider the doctor-patient relationship: A
focus on current satisfaction is like giving the client an aspirin to make h im feel good today, whereas there may be a
more fundamental treatment needed to solve the causes of the headache.
6. Experimentation might be reduced. Teachers maybe less willing to try something new once they have
gained tolerable ratings.
7. The contract is changed for faculty members. They were hired under one set of rules and the rules are
now being changed.
8. It might be more difficult to attract new faculty.
9. Some faculty may perceive that the solution has been made on unfounded grounds. No emp irical
evidence was provided to demonstrate that this policy change on ratings would be beneficial in a situation such as
ours. I would be surprised if such research exits.
10. Are legal issues involved? Given that the prime mission is learning, not entertainment, there may be
legal issues involved in using the present type of teacher evaluation (Miller, 1978). Miller suggests that faculty
members might sue on the basis that they are being judged on a criterion that has been shown to lack validity. (His
article was directed at administrators to alert them of this danger.)
11. Might extrinsic rewards, such as paying for teachers for high ratings by students) reduce the motivation
for a task that many faculty find to be intrinsically rewarding? ('The research on attribution theory suggests this as a
possibility.)
12. Might proposal #1 cause alienation of faculty from students? In environments that stress teacher
evaluations, I have heard teachers make negative statements about students and refer to them as “the enemy.” (This
statement is based purely on unaided observation.)
13. Might some of the faculty react negatively to the assumptions implied by Proposal #1? The proposal is
implies that teaching is a distasteful activity and it is difficult to get someone to do it. It also implies that faculty are
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irresponsible people who respond primarily to punishments. These assumptions are common in the management of
public universities; they have produced abysmal results.
14. Would proposal #1 have an adverse effect on Wharton as a research institution? Based on the recent
study of publications, citations, and peer ratings, Wharton is ranked third among business schools. This represents
our comparative advantage and we should not put it at risk. (It is difficult to see how the proposed changes in
teacher evaluation could improve the research-environment.)

Some Alternatives
The following suggestions are listed in order of importance as I see them.
A. Restate the first proposal as "Establish standards for effective learning." A basic problem is that we have
no measures of learning, which is presumably a primary objective. The committee's recommendation #5 could be
restated to aim at “learning evaluations,” (a point that was raised in the last faculty meeting). It really is not that
difficult to assess learning. I have used end-of-course evaluations that ask students to report their success at
improving skills; the responses to this survey have often differed greatly from their ratings of me as a teacher. When
learning is most effective, the learners believe that they have done it themselves. This attitude also bodes well for
that individual's teaming after graduation. I have also used critical incidents surveys administered six months after
the completion of the course to determine what techniques or concepts students have been able to use. Other
measures include looking at the grades of students in follow-on courses and looking at the number of students who
took follow-on courses. Finally, we should examine what happens to our students after they leave. Are they more
effective on the job? Are they recognized as being effective? Are they able to use techniques and concepts from their
Wharton education? Are they satisfied in retrospect that their learning was useful?
B. Use alternative measures of teacher effectiveness. Allow teachers to obtain evidence of their
effectiveness in aiding the learning process. This would be particularly relevant for those faculty who rely on
experiential learning.
C. Eliminate the cohort system. I was a strong opponent of the cohort system when it was proposed because
it would harm the learning environment (at the same time, I thought it would be popular among students.) The
evidence presented by the committee indicated that the cohort system has created a "teaching problem." It would be
interesting to determine whether the faculty believes that the benefits of the cohort system are so large that they
justify the bad effects. I do not.4 As an alternative, it may be possible to modify the cohort system to allow students
more freedom of choice.
D. Examine the student complaint system to determine whether there have been changes in the
measurement system. A possible hypothesis would be that the Dean's office may encourage students to comp lain
and that students go to the Dean with complaints rather than to the faculty member. If so, it may be useful to ask
whether a more fruitful approach would be to require that students first cry to work out problems with the professor.
(There have been a number of cases where the students have gone directly to the Dean's office when the faculty
member was under the impression that things were going well.)
E. Design the system to promote learning rather than to avoid complaints. The latter approach may lead to a
system designed to cater to the poorest and least interested learners.
F. Increase freedom in the environment. Rather than restrictive rules, we should seek ways to increase
freedom of choice for the faculty and students.
G. Base recommendations on the empirical research on how people learn. An extensive literature exists on
this topic.
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Faculty at, other schools have also reported detrimental effects on learning from the imposition of cohort systems.
(This is hearsay.)
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H. Define the problem from a systems viewpoint. Can we improve the environment for research and
learning? 1n particular, could the learning environment in the second year of the MBA program be improved?
I. When extrinsic incentive are necessary, focus on rewards rather than punishments. How many of us
believe that we respond better to punishment?

Suggestions on Process
I. Survey faculty anonymously on these issues. They are highly sensitive and some faculty have told me
that they do not feel free to speak out about it. This is especially important for those who do not have tenure, but I
have also heard it from those who do have tenure.
II. Seek consensus on this issue. Rather than rushing to a solution, I urge that we seek solutions that would
be acceptable to most of us. If it does, become necessary to vote, I request that the voting be done anonymously.

Conclusions
My opposition against proposal #1 is balanced by my support for all other recommendations by the Wharton
Teaching Committee with one exception. That exception is for #2d which relates to reduced teaching loads for
junior faculty. This recommendation has no clear relationship to the teaching issue. It should be handled as a
separate issue.5
I recommend passage of the Teaching Committee recommendations except for Proposal #1 and #2d. A vote for
#1 is a vote against the research in this area. My prediction, if #1 is instituted, is that our learning environment will
become more like that in most public schools; those environments are less conducive to research and learning.
Hopefully, the proposals will be handled separately. If not, I recommend a vote against the package.
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